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GATES v. COOK: ARE COURTS EQUIPPED TO MANAGE
PRISONS?
KATHERINE T. WAINWRIGHT*
In Gates v. Cook,1 the Fifth Circuit considered whether
injunctive relief was justified by prison conditions in violation of the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. 2 The Court held, inter alia, that an injunction requiring
prison officials to reduce a preventative maintenance schedule and
program to writing violated the principle that courts are not to
micromanage prisons.3 The Court also held that injunctions mandating
that prison officials return inmates' laundry clean and without a foul
smell and allowing prisoners to wear sneakers rather than flip-flops
were invalid because they were not tailored to remedy Eighth
Amendment violations.4
In determining which injunctions were appropriate and which
involved judicial micromanagement of the prison, the court noted that
federalism concerns require that federal courts must provide the least
intrusive remedy that will bring the prison in line with the minimum
constitutional standards when prescribing corrections for state
prisons.5 However, Mississippi prison conditions have been a problem
at least since 1972, and despite the remedies courts have issued for
many years, the unconstitutional conditions persist.6 Deference to
prison officials and legislative inaction has left a void where no entity
is willing to take active steps to improve the prison system. The
current rule, that courts must provide the least intrusive remedy that
will meet the minimum constitutional standard, serves to perpetuate
what has proven to be an ineffective method of remedying
unconstitutional prison conditions. Where courts are the only branch
of government willing to address this problem, they should not
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland, 2006; B.F.A., Syracuse University.
1. 376 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2004).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.
3. Cook, 376 F.3d at 338 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979)).
4. Id. at 344.
5. See Alberti v. Klevenhagan, 790 F.2d 1220, 1227 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Special
Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 869
(1978)).
6. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding prison conditions
unconstitutional in 1974) and Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (holding prison conditions unconstitutional
in 2004).
130 U. of Md. L. J. of Race, Religion, Gender & Class [Vol. 5:129
unnecessarily restrict themselves with such an inflexible standard, but
should be free to tailor remedies that are appropriate under the
circumstances.
I. THE CASE
A. Gates v. Collier and the History of Unconstitutional Conditions in
the Mississippi State Prison System
Like a number of other states, the Mississippi state prison
system has been struggling to reform its prison system for many years.
The struggle began at the Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman in
1974 when two overlapping classes of prisoners sued the
Superintendent of the State Penitentiary, members of the Penitentiary
Board, and the Governor of Mississippi, challenging conditions of
confinement under the Eighth Amendment in Gates v. Collier.7 The
suit alleged a wide range of unconstitutional prison conditions. The
housing units were "unfit for human habitation under any modem
concepts of decency," 8 with hazardous human waste disposal facilities
and a contaminated water supply leading to the spread of infectious
disease. 9 Combined with frayed and exposed wiring, the lack of
adequate firefighting equipment made it almost impossible to put out a
fire at Parchman.10 The bathroom, heating, kitchen, and housing
facilities were grossly inadequate, with broken windows, oil drums cut
in half for washbasins, and otherwise horrid conditions.1 The medical
staff did not provide adequate medical care for the inmates resulting in
delayed and inefficient medical examination, treatment, and
medication.12  Rampant unsanitary conditions compounded the
inadequate medical care to produce a dangerous and unhealthy
environment. 13
Additionally, solitary confinement at Parchman involved a six-
foot by six-foot "dark hole., 14 The cell had no lights, commode, sink,
7. Collier, 501 F.2d at 1294. The first class consisted of all inmates at Parchman, while
the second class included black inmates who additionally claimed racial discrimination and
segregation. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1299.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1300.
13. Id.
14. Collier, 501 F.2d at 1305.
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furnishings, window, bedding, or hygienic materials and had only a
hole in the floor for a toilet.' 5 Furthermore, inmates were placed there
naked, given inadequate food, and were not allowed to wash. 16
Additionally, Parchman maintained a racially segregated prison
system where blacks were subject to disparate treatment.1 7  Blacks
were housed in more crowded quarters, assigned to different work
details, denied the same vocational training opportunities, and were
punished more severely than whites for the same offenses.'
8
The trial court issued both short and long-range injunctive
relief to the inmates.19 The court ordered the prison officials to: (1)
cease censoring prisoners' mail; (2) establish definite and
constitutional rules and regulations for inmate discipline; (3) cease
corporal punishment so severe as to "offend present concepts of
human dignity"; (4) cease using disciplinary segregation and isolation
except where it satisfies constitutional standards; (5) improve medical
facilities and staff; (6) institute reasonable procedures to protect
inmates from assault by other inmates; (7) abolish the trusty system in
its use of prisoners to oversee other inmates; and (8) make certain
renovations of Parchman's physical facilities that posed hazards to
prisoner health.2'
When the Mississippi Department of Corrections (hereinafter
MDOC) challenged these injunctions, the Fifth Circuit examined
whether the district court correctly determined the extent to which
Parchman's facilities and practices had to be modified to meet
constitutional standards. 22 The Fifth Circuit ruled that the trial court's
discretion in providing a remedy was limited to that minimally
required to comport with the Constitution's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.2 3 In that case, the prison officials did not
even challenge the district court's holdings that equal protection
required reclassification of prisoners on a non-racial basis and that the
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1299.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1295.
20. Id at 1299. The trusty system was the prison's practice of using inmates, who had
supposedly proved themselves trustworthy, as guards. Id. They were generally untrained and
armed, and for the most part had not actually shown any signs of trustworthiness, but rather
obtained their positions through favoritism, bribery, and extortion. Id.
21. Collier, 501 F.2d at 1295-96.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1303.
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Eighth Amendment required improvements in Parchman's physical
and medical facilities as well as the abolition of the trusty system.
The court found that all of the injunctions were appropriate and
within the jurisdiction of the district court. 25 The court recognized that
these limits only alleviated conditions to meet the minimal
constitutional standard.26
B. What the State Has Done
The state legislature has done relatively little to combat the
problems in the Mississippi prison system. The Mississippi Code
contains several general provisions that prisoners must be treated
humanely, but no substantive regulations have been enacted to enforce
these provisions.2 7 In the original 1942 prison legislation, the state
policy for Operation and Management of Prisons directed that, "Those
convicted of violating the law and sentenced to a term in the state
correctional system shall have humane treatment. .... "29 Additionally,
the policy states that the Department of Corrections shall be
"responsible for the proper care, treatment, feeding, clothing, and
management of the offenders therein. ' 29
In 1976, the legislature included in the General Powers and
Duties of the Department of Corrections a duty "(t)o provide for the
care, custody, study, training, supervision and treatment of adult
offenders committed to the department.,' 30  That same year, the
legislature also authorized the Bureau of Building, Grounds and Real
Property Administration and the State Board of Health to conduct
inspections of the institutional housing and service facilities for repairs
and maintenance, sewage collection and treatment, solid waste
collection, rodent and pest control, and a number of other factors. 31
In 1985, the legislature adopted provisions to deal with
32 3overcrowded prison conditions, but these were repealed in 2004.3
25. Id. at 1310-31.
26. Id.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 26-34.
28. MIss. CODE ANN. § 47-5-1 (2004).
29. § 47-5-23.
30. § 47-5-10.
31. § 47-5-94.
32. §§ 47-4-707 to 47-5-729 (These provisions required the prison Commissioner to
notify the Governor and State Parole Board whenever the prison exceeds 95% of its capacity;
that the State Parole Board meet and report its determination of whether they have taken all
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The legislative provisions that withstood the 2004 act were largely
procedural. Then, in 1989, the legislature added that if an inmate files
a civil action in forma pauperis against an employee of the
Department of Corrections pertaining to the inmate's condition of
confinement, the Department must pay all court costs unless the
prisoner has brought three or more previous actions that were
dismissed as frivolous or malicious. 34 Finally, pursuant to the federal
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 35  the Mississippi
Legislature authorized the MDOC to create an administrative review
procedure for remedying prisoner actions against the state of
Mississippi, the MDOC, or its officials or officers.
3 6
C. Mississippi Prison Conditions Today: Gates v. Cook
Appellee Willie Russell sued MDOC alleging that he and other
prisoners confined to death row in the Mississippi State Penitentiary in
Parchman, Mississippi were knowingly and deliberately subjected to
conditions that violated the Eighth Amendment.37  Specifically,
Russell asserted that MDOC subjected death row inmates to profound
isolation, dangerously high temperatures and humidity, lack of
adequate exercise, intolerable stench and filth, malfunctioning
plumbing, constant exposure to human excrement, uncontrolled
appropriate actions to remedy the situation; that the Governor has the power to declare a state
of emergency; and to conditionally advance the dates of parole eligibility).
33. § 47-5-731.
34. § 47-5-76(1). This provision does not apply to appeals. See Carson v. Hargett, 689
So.2d 753 (Miss. 1996).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1997 (2004); 28 C.F.R. 40 (2004).
36. MIss. CODE ANN. § 47-5-801 to 47-5-807 (2004). Accordingly, MDOC implemented
the administrative remedy program. The administrative process begins with a prisoner's
written complaint about a prison condition or other issue. MississiPPi DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, PRISONER HANDBOOK, Ch. VIII, § 11 (2004) [hereinafter MDOC, HANDBOOK].
The Legal Claims Adjudicator then screens all complaints and rejects those that are either not
within the power of the MDOC to remedy or are otherwise objectionable. Id. § V. If the
request is accepted, the Legal Claims Adjudicator is supposed to provide some response or,
where appropriate, a meaningful remedy. Id. § II. A prisoner may not obtain judicial review
of his complaint until he has exhausted the administrative remedy program. Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2004). Mississippi prisoners have filed 377
administrative review petitions at Parchman, and 1,065 review petitions statewide.
Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, Admin. Remedy Program, at
http://www.mdoc.state.ms.us/administrative-remedy-program.htm (October 16, 2004).
Additionally, MDOC has an offender legal assistance program to provide offenders adequate
opportunity to present claims that their fundamental constitutional rights have been violated.
MDOC, HANDBOOK, Ch. VIII, § I.A. However, this program is limited to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims. Id. § III D.
37. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 1, Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (No. 03-60529).
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mosquitoes and insect infestations, deprivation of basic mental health
care, and constant exposure to severely psychotic inmates in adjoining
cells. 38  Russell alleged that exposure to these conditions caused
inmates intense physical and emotional pain and suffering which was
likely to cause serious mental illness, placing class members at a high
risk of premature death.39 A corrections expert testified that "virtually
every environmental condition, every physical condition, has the effect
of causing continuing pain far beyond discomfort, a condition I can
only describe as hellish."4 °
Inmates were confined in profound isolation, which causes
tremendous stress 41 and can combine with other conditions to cause
42complete psychiatric breakdowns. Prisoners were exposed to
dangerously excessive heat and humidity.43 In August, prisoners were
subjected to a heat index that ranged from 101-140' Fahrenheit
without access to air conditioning, sufficient cool water, fans in their
cells, or adequate cool showers."4 After visiting Parchman's Death
Row, one of the plaintiffs' experts, a Texan used to extreme heat,
testified that the heat in the cell "was simply unbearable. One couldn't
draw a breath. I became almost panicked.
4 5
This excessive heat could lead to heat stroke, which leads to
46
serious neurological damage or death. Additionally, excessive heat
creates a heightened risk for existing illnesses such as heart disease
47
48
and Parkinson's disease. The experts concluded that, "inevitabl[y]
... a prisoner will die of heat-related illness;" it was pure luck that it
had not happened already.49
Uncontrolled mosquito and insect infestation exacerbated the
heat conditions and posed risks of its own.50  "Insects swarm in the
prisoners' food and in their beds, and a prisoner must choose between
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 16.
41. Id. at 25.
42. Id. at 23.
43. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 4, Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (No. 03-60529).
44. Id. at 19.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 20. Heat stroke has a 50% mortality rate. Id.
47. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, About Extreme Heat, available at
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/disasters/extremeheat/about.asp (last modified May 14, 2004).
48. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Frequently Asked Questions About
Extreme Heat, available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/disasters/extremeheat/faq.asp) (last
modified May 18, 2004).
49. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 20, Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (No. 03-60529).
50. Id. at 10.
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opening his window for relief from the stifling heat, or closing his
window and covering his entire body as protection from the
mosquitoes." 5' This combination causes chronic sleep deprivation,
which induces mental illness and worsens existing illness.
52
Nevertheless, the prison had no pest control program and provided
only damaged and inadequate screening.
53
Furthermore, the prison toilets had malfunctioned since the unit
was built in 1990.54 "Ping-pong toilets" caused fecal and other matter
flushed from one toilet to bubble up into the toilet in the adjoining
cell.55  This malfunction exposed prisoners to the risk of contagion
from the microorganisms in the fecal matter.56 MDOC had known
about the problem before the unit was occupied, and the Mississippi
Department of Health had warned prison officials that the problem
required immediate attention every year for the previous eleven
years.
57
Although prison conditions were sufficient to induce and
exacerbate psychosis5 8 in inmates, the facility provided grossly
inadequate mental health care. 59 Of the inmates on Death Row, three
were extremely psychotic, over eight were very psychotic, twenty had
very serious mental illness, and half had very significant mental
illness. Plaintiffs' experts concluded that the profound isolation,
idleness, extreme squalor, stench, filth, excessive heat, mosquito and
insect infestation, and grossly inadequate mental health care created
"an environment highly toxic to mental health.",6' Psychotic inmates
would smear their cells with excrement and garbage, throw feces down
the halls, and shriek at night.62  These behaviors caused chronicinsomnia, leading to and exacerbating mental disorders in other
51. Id.
52. Id. at 10-11.
53. ld. at 11.
54. Id.
55. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 11, Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (No. 03-60529).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 11-12.
58. Psychosis is a mental disorder involving hallucinations and delusions. AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS,
FOURTH EDITION 297 (4th ed. 1994).
59. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees at 12, Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (No. 03-60529).
60. Id. The terms "extremely psychotic," "very psychotic, "very serious mental
illness," and "very significant mental illness" are not defined in the DSM-IV; nor are the terms
defined in the district court opinion, the appellate court opinion, or the Brief for Plaintiff-
Appellees.
61. Id.
62. Id.
2005]
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inmates. 63 The presence of psychotic prisoners creates a management
problem which lessens the security of the prison by distracting guards
and workers. 64 Moreover, MDOC rotated prisoners into cells recently
occupied by psychotic inmates, which were covered with garbage,
urine, feces, and ejaculate, and refused to provide inmates with
cleaning supplies.
65
Any mental health care provided was inadequate because it
took place at the cell front where prisoners could not reveal anything
of substance for fear of being overheard by other inmates or prison
guards. 66  Additionally, psychiatric medications were dispensed by
prison officials rather than mental health professionals, were
sporadically monitored, and often dispensed incorrectly or not at all.67
This practice was extremely dangerous and potentially life-threatening
because of the medications' toxicity and side effects.
6
Finally, the prison did not conduct or have a plan for
maintenance and preventive maintenance. 69 The unit was filthy, with
water from flooded toilets and rain sinking in from overhead, walls
encrusted with excrement thrown by psychotic inmates, and laundry
returned dirty and foul-smelling. 7° The only time inmates were
allowed to clean was when they were given a mop and bucket once a
week, although the bucket did not contain any soap or sanitizing
agent.7' In fact, hand-washing clothes was a rule infraction.72
Holding that the plaintiffs had shown that they were
incarcerated under conditions imposing a substantial risk of harm, the
court issued ten injunctions to remedy the unconstitutional
conditions.73 The first injunction directed MDOC to ensure that the
cell to which an inmate is moved is cleaned prior to the move. 74 The
second injunction mandated that prison officials provide adequate
cleaning supplies to inmates so that they may clean their cells at least
63. Id. at 13.
64. Id.
65. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees at 13, Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (No. 03-60529).
66. Id. at 14.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 16.
70. Id. at 16-17.
71. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellees at 17, Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (No. 03-60529).
72. Id.
73. Russell v. Johnson, No. I:02CV261-JAD, 2003 WL 22208029, at *5 (N.D. Miss.
2003 May 21, 2003).
74. Id. (noting that while an inmate should be required to clean his own cell, he should
not be required to clean the cell of another inmate in order to live in it).
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once a week.75 The third injunction required MDOC to create a
written preventative maintenance schedule and program within sixty
days of the order. 76
The fourth injunction directed MDOC to determine the heat
index and ensure that each cell would be equipped with a fan, that ice
water would be available to every inmate, and that each inmate be
allowed to take one shower a day either when the heat index reached
ninety degrees or, alternatively, between the months of May and
September. 77 The fifth injunction required MDOC to continue their
efforts at pest eradication and to ensure that all cell windows are
repaired and screened with an eighteen-gauge screen or better.
78
The sixth injunction directed MDOC to ensure that the problem
of ping-pong toilets was addressed and to provide the court with a plan
to eradicate the problem within sixty days of the order. 79 The seventh
injunction required MDOC to upgrade the lighting in each cell. 80 The
eighth injunction mandated that MDOC ensure that proper chemical
agents be used in the laundry so that the inmates' clothing were
returned clean and not foul smelling.
81
The ninth injunction required MDOC to ensure that each
inmate on Death Row be given a comprehensive mental health
examination in private on a yearly basis. 82  The injunction also
directed that psychotic inmates and those diagnosed with severe
mental illness be housed separately and that all inmates receiving
psychotropic medication be monitored and assessed in accordance
with appropriate medical standards. 83 The final injunction directed
MDOC to provide inmates with the opportunity to wear sneakers while
exercising.
The Fifth Circuit granted review to determine whether the case
should have been brought under the framework of Gates v. Collier,
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 6. This injunction purported to apply to all of Unit 32 rather than just Death
Row. Id.
79. Russell, 2003 WL 22208029, at *6.
80. Id. This injunction also purported to apply to all of Unit 32. Id.
81. Id.
82. ld.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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whether the injunctions were justified by conditions constituting cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
85
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Origin and Background of the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition
Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Judicial interpretation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment has evolved over time. The
drafters' primary concern was to proscribe torture and other barbarous
methods of punishment; 86 however, in recent years, courts have held
that punishments incompatible with "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" also violate the
Eighth Amendment.
87
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Eighth
Amendment requires the government to care for inmates. 88 Part of the
logic behind this change is the idea that when the government takes
someone into custody against their will, the government is restraining
their liberty and rendering them unable to care for themselves.
89
Accordingly, the Constitution imposes a duty upon the government to
provide humane conditions of confinement, clothing, shelter,9 °
adequate food, 9 1 exercise, hygiene, and medical care,9 and to take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates.
95
85. Cook, 376 F.3d at 323. The court also reviewed whether the class members
exhausted their administrative remedies. Id.
86. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976), rehearing denied 429 U.S. 1066 (1977)
(citing Anthony F. Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted: The Original
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969)).
87. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
88. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993).
89. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200
(1989).
90. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984).
91. French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1255 (7th Cir. 1985) (requiring safe, sanitary, and
nutritious food).
92. Id. at 1255.
93. Collier, 501 F.2d at 1318.
94. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06 (holding that prison officials violate the 8th Amendment
when they act with deliberate indifference to prisoners' serious medical needs).
95. Alberti, 790 F.2d at 1228 (requiring the prescence of a specific number of guards on
each floor during each shift and requiring hourly inspections of inmates' cells to ensure their
safety).
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B. The Eighth Amendment Standard
A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when (1)
the deprivation is sufficiently serious and (2) the prison official has a
sufficiently culpable state of mind.96 For the first prong of the test, a
deprivation is sufficiently serious when a prison official's act or
omission results in the extreme denial of the minimal civilized
measures of life's necessities. 97  In a case alleging that prison
conditions are unconstitutional, the burden of proof is on the inmate to
show that the conditions pose a substantial risk of serious harm. 98 For
the second prong, a prison official has a sufficiently culpable state of
mind when he or she is deliberately indifferent to the safety or health
of the inmate.
99
Determining the first prong, whether prison conditions pose a
substantial risk of harm to a prisoner, is a question of law that is
contingent upon factors which vary based on the nature of the
conditions. 00 For example, courts will consider the amount of time an
inmate is exposed to harsh conditions when determining whether they
have been deprived of any minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities. 1°  Current injury is not a prerequisite to recovery; a
prisoner is only required to show that the conditions pose an
unreasonable risk of serious harm to a prisoner's future health. 
°2
96. Id. at 834.
97. Id. (citing Helling, 509 U.S. at 35).
98. Id.
99. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-303 (1991)).
100. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (holding that the use of excessive force
may constitute cruel and unusual punishment even though the inmate does not suffer serious
injury). These factors include what the conditions are, how serious they are, and how long
prisoners have been exposed to the conditions. For example, in deciding that housing two
inmates in a single cell did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the court examined
how "double celling" would affect prisoners. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348-49
(1981). In determining that limiting some prisoners to less than five hours of indoor exercise
per week was not a constitutional violation, the court considered the prison's facilities and that
prisoners were usually allowed ninety minutes of outdoor exercise per week during good
weather. French, 777 F.2d at 1255-56.
101. Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1006 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that inmate did not
make out an Eighth Amendment claim where there was blood on the walls and excrement on
the floor of a cell when he was only confined there for three days and was given cleaning
supplies).
102. Helling, 509 U.S. at 33 (holding that a prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim could be
based upon future harm to health as well as present harm arising out of exposure to
environmental tobacco smoke).
20051
140 U. of Md. L. J. of Race, Religion, Gender & Class [Vol. 5:129
Determining the second prong, whether a prison official has
been deliberately indifferent to the safety or health of an inmate, is a
question of fact'0 3 judged by a subjective standard. 10 4  The Eighth
Amendment forbids only cruel and unusual punishment.'0 5  Courts
have defined punishment as a deliberate act intended to chastise or
deter. 0 6 If there is no actual intent to punish, a prison official must
recklessly disregard the risk. 10 7 The official must be aware of facts
from which he or she could draw the inference that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists and the official must have actually made that
inference. 108  For example, in Duckworth v. Franzen, the court
considered whether transporting handcuffed prisoners in a vehicle
where all exits were sealed from prisoners rose to the level of cruel
and unusual punishment when an accident caused a fire, killing one
prisoner and severely injuring several others.1°9 The court held that
the prison officials' conduct, even if negligent, was not sufficiently
reckless to constitute punishment." 0
In order to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation, conduct
that does not purport to be punishment must be callous and wanton,
not simply inadvertent or an error in good faith."' An official must
know of and disregard a risk to inmates' health or safety. 112  For
example, in Farmer v. Brennan, a transsexual prisoner claimed that
prison officials showed "deliberate indifference" by placing him with
the general prison population and failing to keep him from harm
despite knowing that the prisoner was a transsexual who would be
particularly vulnerable to sexual attack." 13 The United States Supreme
Court held that in order to establish an Eighth Amendment violation,
the prison official must know of and disregard an excessive risk to
inmates' heath or safety.' 14 Accordingly, the Court remanded the case
for further consideration to determine whether the prison official knew
of the risk to the plaintiff." 5
103. Brice v. Virginia Beach Ctr., 48 F.3d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1995).
104. Farmer, 511 U.S.at 829.
105. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300.
106. Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985).
107. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 830.
108. Id. at 837.
109. Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 648.
110. Id. at 653.
111. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
112. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
113. Id. at 830-31 (prisoner was raped and beaten by another inmate).
114. Id. at 837.
115. Id.
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In deciding whether prison conditions violated the Eighth
Amendment, courts formerly held that they need not weigh each
practice and condition separately, but may look to see whether the
totality of the circumstances of confinement offend the Constitution
and are cruel and unusual, rather than merely harsh and restrictive. 
1 6
However, Wilson v. Seiter established that although some conditions
of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation in
combination when each would not do so alone, this occurs only when
they have a mutually enforcing effect that deprives the prisoner of a
single identifiable human need, such as food, warmth or exercise."
7
For example, a low cell temperature at night, combined with the
refusal to issue blankets, together would result in the denial of warmth
to a prisoner." 1
8
C. The Remedy
Once a constitutional violation has been established, district
courts have wide discretion to fashion a remedy' 9 to address each
element contributing to the violation.1 20  Normally, this discretion is
limited only by the requirement that the remedy is tailored to the
underlying cruel and unusual conditions.' 21  However, federalism
concerns require that when federal courts are fashioning remedies for
state prisons, they must provide the least intrusive remedy that will
still be effective. 12 2 This is based on the principle that "[a] federal
court should not, under the guise of enforcing constitutional standards,
assume the superintendence of jail administration." '123
When deciding whether a remedy is appropriate, appellate
courts look to whether the remedy will help to correct the
116. Alberti, 790 F.2d at 1223-24.
117. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304.
118. Id.
119. Alberti, 780 F.2d at 1227.
120. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1979).
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing Special Project: The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation,
78 COLUM. L. REv. 784, 869 (1978)). For example, in Duckworth v. Franzen, the court stated
that "prison administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and
execution of policies and practices ... " in deciding that transporting prisoners in handcuffs
with the exits sealed did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 780 F.2d at 655.
Likewise, in Castillo v. Cameron County, Texas, the court considered whether a temporary
injunction was narrowly drawn and the least intrusive remedy to correct the violation to hold
that the record did not contain sufficient evidence to support the injunction. 238 F.3d 339,
354-55 (5th Cir. 2001).
123. Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981).
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unconstitutional conditions, whether it will interfere with prison
administration, and the experience of the trial judge with the problem
at hand.124 For example, the court in Gates v. Collier held that the
district court alleviated conditions only to the minimum constitutional
standard where the district court did not abolish solitary confinement,
but rather ordered: (1) that inmates in solitary confinement be fed the
daily ration each day; (2) that they be issued regular prison clothing;
(3) that they be provided with soap, towels, a toothbrush, and shaving
needs; (4) that the cell be heated, ventilated and sanitary; and (5) that
prisoners be kept in solitary confinement for no more than twenty-four
hours.125  This order specifically corrected the unconstitutional
conditions without interfering with the prison's ability to use solitary
confinement.
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Gates v. Cook, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
considered whether each injunction was supported by an underlying
Eighth Amendment violation after holding that the case need not have
been brought under the Gates v. Collier framework and that the class
had satisfied the requirement that it exhaust its administrative
remedies.126 The court affirmed seven of the ten injunctions ordered
by the trial court and vacated three injunctions, holding that they were
not supported by Eighth Amendment violations.'
27
After establishing the relevant standards of law, the court then
turned to the individual injunctions. First, it considered whether the
first and second injunctions, prohibiting MDOC from requiring
inmates to clean the cells into which they are transferred and requiring
MDOC to provide adequate cleaning supplies to inmates at least
weekly, were justified by constitutional violations.12  MDOC argued
that these injunctions could not stand because there was no proof of
medical injury or illness resulting from these practices and no showing
of deliberate indifference by MDOC employees. 29 The court held that
since living in such conditions would present a substantial risk of
serious harm to inmates and such conditions were typical and easily
124. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 687-88.
125. 501 F.2d 1291.
126. Cook, 376 F.3d at 327-44.
127. Id. at 337-44.
128. Id. at 337-38.
129. Id. at 338.
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observed, the trial court's conclusion that MDOC officials showed
deliberate indifference to the cells' cleanliness was not clearly
erroneous. 1
30
Next, the court considered whether the third injunction,
directing MDOC to reduce a general preventive maintenance plan to
writing, was supported by evidence of cruel and unusual
punishment. 31 In response to MDOC's argument that the requirement
was not supported by a constitutional violation, the prisoners argued
that the risks of squalid conditions were obvious and that the same
problems would continue to recur unless MDOC put a written plan in
place. 132 However, the court applied the principle that courts are not to
micromanage state prisons, 133to vacate the injunction because the
additional requirement of a written preventative maintenance plan was
not independently supported by additional unconstitutional conditions
since the trial court had entered injunctions to remedy directly each
condition that constituted an Eighth Amendment violation.' 
34
The court then addressed whether the fourth injunction,
directing MDOC to provide fans, ice water, and daily showers when
the heat index is above ninety degrees or, alternatively, between the
months of May and September, was valid. 135 MDOC argued that the
injunction was invalid because no inmate in Unit 32-C had ever
suffered from a serious heat-related illness. 136 The court affirmed the
injunction, holding that since there was a realistic possibility of heat-
related illness and these conditions were open and obvious, there was a
substantial risk of serious harm to which prison officials were
deliberately indifferent.' 
37
In turn, the court looked to see whether the fifth injunction,
requiring MDOC to continue its efforts at pest eradication and provide
eighteen-gauge window screens in all cell windows, was supported
sufficiently by cruel and unusual conditions.' 38  Although MDOC
argued that there was no basis for the district court to order MDOC to
continue what it was already doing, the court found that MDOC had
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Cook, 376 F.3d at 338.
133. Id. (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 562).
134. Id. at 339.
135. Id. The court found that the injunction was invalid to the extent that it purported to
apply to parts of Unit 32 beyond Unit 32-C. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 340.
138. Cook, 376 F.3d at 340. The court found that the injunction was invalid to the extent
that applied to Unit 32 beyond Unit 32-C. Id.
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not met the burden of proving that its efforts at pest control had
mooted the issue.139
Next, the court considered whether the "ping-pong toilet"
problem rose to the level of an unconstitutional condition. 140 MDOC
argued that there is no evidence of any serious medical problem
caused by the "ping-pong toilets" and that exposure to raw sewage is
not cruel and unusual punishment where there is no showing of
adverse medical reaction. 14 1 However, the court distinguished a case
where exposure to raw sewage was held not to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment 14 2 because the prisoners had been regularly
exposed to each other's feces for over a decade. 14 3 Based on expert
testimony that the "ping-pong toilets" created a serious health hazard,
the court held that the toilets created a substantial risk of serious harm
to inmates and affirmed the injunction as it applied to unit 32-C. 144
The court next addressed the issue of whether the injunction
requiring MDOC to upgrade the lighting in each cell was valid.'45
Although MDOC argued that the lighting posed no substantial risk of
serious harm, the court found that the injunction was supported by
evidence that the lighting was grossly inadequate for sanitation,
personal hygiene, and reading, thus further contributing to mental
health deterioration. 1
46
Next, the court considered whether the eighth injunction,
requiring MDOC to return prisoners' laundry clean and without a foul
smell, was supported by an Eighth Amendment violation. 147 MDOC
supported its contention that there is no constitutional violation by
referencing a case where a court found that an injunction requiring a
prison to provide laundry services was overturned because prisoners
were provided with laundry detergent and could wash their clothes in
their sinks. 14 8 Although the petitioner tried to distinguish that case
139. Id.
140. Id. at 340-41. The term "ping-pong toilets" refers to the problem that when one
toilet is flushed, the feces and other material flushed bubble up in the adjoining cell unless
both are flushed at the same time. Id. at 334.
141. Id. at 341 (citing Tokar v. Armontrout, 97 F.3d 1078 (8th Cir. 1996)).
142. Tokar, 97 F.3d 1078 (finding that exposure to fecal matter was not cruel and unusual
punishment where inmates were exposed for only a few days).
143. Cook, 376 F.3d at 341.
144. Id.
145. ld. To the extent that the injunction purported to apply to all of Unit 32-C, the court
found that it was invalid. ld.
146. Id. at 342.
147. Id.
148. Id. (citing Green v. Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765, 771 (5th Cir. 1986)).
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because the prisoners here were not provided with detergent, the court
did not find the distinction significant and vacated the injunction. 14
9
The court then addressed whether the ninth injunction,
imposing various requirements to alleviate the inadequate mental
health care problem, was justified by cruel and unusual conditions. 50
The court found that the inadequate mental health care did pose a
substantial risk of significant harm based on testimony that conditions
create an environment "toxic" to prisoners' health, that severely
psychotic prisoners smear garbage and excrement in the cells and
scream all night, and that medical monitoring was sporadic, leading to
extremely dangerous physical effects or psychotic breakdowns.
15
'
Accordingly, the court upheld the injunction finding that the trial court
was not clearly erroneous in deciding that prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to this risk when the conditions were obvious
and pervasive. 1
52
Finally, the court considered whether the tenth injunction,
requiring MDOC to allow prisoners access to sneakers instead of flip-
flops while exercising and to provide a shaded area for exercise and
access to water, was permissible.' 53 Although Russell argued that flip-
flops did not allow vigorous exercise, the court noted that inmates
were allowed an hour of exercise four or five days a week and that
inmates used shoes and boots to kick other inmates and throw at
MDOC staff.154 Accordingly, the court found that an hour of exercise
in flip-flops without water or shade did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment 155 and vacated the tenth injunction.' 5
6
IV. ANALYSIS
Although the court claims to apply two rules, it really draws an
arbitrary line between the injunctions it decides are permissible and
those it holds impermissible. First, the court states that each injunction
must be tailored to an underlying Eighth Amendment violation.
57
149. Cook, 376 F.3d at 342.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 343.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 343.
154. Id. at 344.
155. Cook, 376 F.3d at 344.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 338.
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Second, it states that courts are not to micromanage prisons.158 Under
the guise of these general rules, the court draws a seemingly arbitrary
line between, on the one hand, invalidating an injunction mandating
that a preventative maintenance schedule be reduced to writing, 5 9 and,
on the other hand, upholding an injunction that dictates the exact
gauge of screen to be used.
160
Instead of continuing this confusing pretense, courts need a
new, more flexible standard to allow meaningful and open
consideration of the realities of legislative and administrative inaction.
Therefore, the court should have adopted a flexible test weighing the
federalism interests of the state and the prison authorities in being able
to effectively run the prison against the likelihood that those
institutions will protect the prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights
considering all of the facts and circumstances. Then, district courts
would be able to fashion remedies suited to the particular
circumstances of the case and the jurisdiction.161 In Cook, this would
have allowed the court to consider the history of unconstitutional
conditions in the Mississippi prison system and its failure to remedy
them to uphold the injunction requiring a written preventative
maintenance plan. This one injunction might have negated the need
for some of the other injunctions and would likely have been
particularly effective in the long run.
In Mississippi, federal courts remain the only institution
willing and able to correct and prevent unconstitutional prison
conditions. The court has been willing to review prison conditions and
provide specific injunctions against unconstitutional conditions ever
since Gates v. Collier. Yet their authority is limited to providing the
least burdensome remedy possible to get the prison into compliance
with the Constitution. 162 Although courts have noted that they are not
to assume control of prisons, no case has established where this line is
drawn except to say that if an injunction is not supported by an
underlying Eighth Amendment violation, it cannot stand. Thus, it is
very unclear what this limit actually is. Perhaps this is because courts
are aware of legislative inaction and see the need for intervention,
158. Id.
159. Id. at 338.
160. Id. at 340.
161. Additionally, any remedy would require an accompanying enforcement mechanism,
but that issue is beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion on the enforceability of
federal remedies, see Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal
Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735 (1992).
162. Alberti, 790 F.2d at 1227.
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making them disinclined to leave a vague remedial order in the hands
of prison officials who have proved time after time to be ineffective in
protecting prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights.
MDOC has been struggling with unconstitutional prison
conditions for at least thirty-two years, and aside from eliminating
racial discrimination, it has achieved relatively little. Deference to the
state and prison officials has left a void in reforming prison conditions
that no governmental entity has been willing to fill. Additionally, the
district courts' power to fashion remedies is limited to remedying
unconstitutional conditions through damages for past harms and
injunctions to prevent future unconstitutional conduct. 163 These limits
allow courts to order very few concrete changes. Although it is within
the legislature's power to establish laws to positively protect and guard
the rights of prisoners, they have delegated that task, with very little
guidance, to the MDOC. 164 In turn, MDOC has not issued concrete
regulations directing prisons how to protect the rights of prisoners.
Instead, all they have done is to establish the limited administrative
review program and legal assistance program.' 65 Thus, in Mississippi,
the federal courts remain the only institution with the ability and will
to require the improvement of prison conditions. Therefore, the
federalism-based requirement that courts must choose the least
intrusive remedy that will still be effective ignores the reality of
legislative inaction; courts must exceed that limit in order to provide
effective remedies.
In Gates v. Cook, it would seem that the court might have
transgressed the current boundary in several places. First, the court
directed MDOC to determine the heat index by taking the temperature
several times a day for a period of time and to provide fans, ice water,
and daily showers when the heat index is ninety degrees or above.
166
This seems incredibly specific and would seem to transgress any
reasonable interpretation of "assuming superintendence of prisons."
However, the court held that the injunction was proper because it was
supported by an Eighth Amendment violation and MDOC did not
show that the trial court's finding that there was an extreme probability
of heat-related illness was clearly erroneous.' 
67
163. Cook, 376 F.3d at 303.
164. MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-5-801 (2004) (authorizing MDOC to create an administrative
review procedure).
165. MDOC, HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at §§ II, V.
166. Cook, 376 F.3d at 338.
167. Id. at 340.
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Similarly, the court's affirmation of the trial court's direction
that all cell windows were to be repaired and screened with eighteen
gauge window screen or better 168 would seem to violate the doctrine
that courts are not to assume the superintendence of prisons. If an
injunction specifying the particular gauge of window screen is not
assuming the superintendence of a prison, it is hard to imagine what
might cross that line. However, the court upheld the injunction
because it was supported by an Eighth Amendment violation.'
69
Although the court upheld the very specific injunctions above,
it rejected an injunction directing MDOC to reduce a general
preventative maintenance schedule and program to writing. The court
stated that the injunction was inappropriate because it was not
independently supported by Eighth Amendment violations not
corrected by other injunctions. Such an injunction would likely do a
good deal to correct some of the other violations. An enforceable
maintenance schedule could correct the problems of ping-pong toilets,
inadequate screens, and filthy cells. Additionally, it would prevent
similar future problems. The petitioner's environmental health and
safety expert testified that "these same problems would continue to
recur" if there was no written plan in place. 170  The court, while
admitting that such a plan was "desirable," nevertheless held that it
was not independently supported by unconstitutional conditions and
vacated the injunction.
Instead of continuing with the confusing fagade of fashioning
remedies that are the least intrusive possible to remedy the underlying
Eighth Amendment violations while really drawing arbitrary lines, the
court should have adopted a standard that allowed the court to consider
all of the facts and circumstances. If they had done so, the court could
have considered that MDOC has had similar problems since 1972, and
since it had proven unwilling to remedy these conditions on its own,
could have upheld the preventative maintenance schedule.
V. CONCLUSION
The State of Mississippi has proven itself to be an ineffective
guardian of prisoners rights, thus federalism concerns are superseded
by the need to protect this vulnerable class of people. Although the
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 336.
Are Courts Equipped to Manage Prisons?
courts have been working to remedy unconstitutional prison conditions
at Parchman for over thirty years now, it appears that the judiciary has
failed to motivate prison administrators to address the problem
themselves. Since the court is the only body willing to assume the role
of guarding prisoners' rights, they need a new standard that will allow
them to provide specific remedies tailored to the facts and
circumstances of the case. A more flexible standard could help the
federal court bring Mississippi prisons in line with today's "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
'
'
71
171. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
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